Reassurance has been at the core of NSNW deployments in Europe since the mid-1950s. NSNW-ground-, air-, and sea-based-were introduced in 
Reassurance and CEE States
In As NATO prepared to write its new Strategic Concept in 2010, therefore, there was concern in CEE states 
Seven Paths to Reassurance in Article 5
Numerous measures to help reassure CEE and South- It may therefore also be useful to explore whether U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM) should develop its own contingency plans for defending this region.
These Article 5 contingency plans need to be exercised at the usual levels-command-post exercises, There is also concern that even with proper contingency plans and exercises, NATO will not be able to make decisions quickly enough to respond to provocations. These do not primarily concern NSNW, although the nuclear bodies within NATO could benefit from updating and a greater degree of transparency about their planning assumptions and operational arrangements.
Two steps can help to reassure these conventional con- now spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, and manpower levels have decreased significantly and seemingly will continue to do so after withdrawals from Afghanistan. 27 The U.S.
contribution to overall NATO defense spending has risen, since a decade ago, from about half the total budget to nearly three-quarters today. The United States and NATO are now discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia. Russia has sought a single, interoperable system, whereas the United States and NATO have insisted on two separate systems. Russia has asserted the need for mutual treaty limits on missile defense numbers, location, interceptor velocity, and deployments. Initially, Russia proposed both system integration and a "sectoral approach" that would have given Russia responsibility for the defense of some NATO territory close to its borders. The Alliance has firmly rejected the sectoral approach, and it appears that Russia has abandoned this proposal as well.
Most of these
The United States has proposed a center or centers to fuse launch and other data to build a common operating picture in order to allow for common training in operations and other cooperative arrangements to give Russia a greater sense of comfort without necessitating a common system. 35 The future of missile defense cooperation will be a major determining factor in Russia's willingness to consider further NSNW reductions.
Despite NATO's decision to deploy EPAA, there is the possibility that in the future NATO members may need
CEE Allies have consistently called for a higher level of permanent NATO involvement in their region
to decide on whether additional steps are necessary to deter
Iran from using nuclear-tipped missiles against NATO. Officer exchange programs could be established, which focus on nuclear issues. High-level seminars similar to the Vienna Doctrine Seminars of the 1990s could be held on nuclear doctrine and strategy. Exercises could be held to practice responses to nuclear accidents and improve nuclear forensics.
Developing an approach designed to address Russian NSNW would require close consultation with Allies and careful negotiations with Russia. But this approach, along with further reassurance measures discussed above, presents perhaps the most promising path to "create the conditions" for further NSNW reductions.
Conclusions
As Steps pertaining to the sixth measure-maximizing the safety, security, effectiveness, and credibility of NSNW-are necessary to retain confidence in NATO's deterrence and defense posture throughout the Alliance.
Finally, the seventh measure-involving approaches to achieve Russian actions relating to transparency, location, and numbers of NSNW-will be central to reassurance of Allies.
Future NATO NSNW reductions and reassurance measures will need to be carefully orchestrated and involve three steps for NATO: focus on balanced steps designed to reassure Allies and limit negative Russian responses; continue to promote improved relations with Russia, including mutual and reciprocal steps relating to NSNW; and ensure NATO's deterrence and defense posture, including nuclear deterrence, remains credible.
Summary of Impact of Seven Measures
The Importance to Conventional Reassurance ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ Importance to Nuclear Reassurance ■ ■ ▲ ▲ The statement declared U.S. and Russian intentions to "work with all interested countries" and "discuss the possibility of imparting a global character to this important regime." This may be a harder case to make, in particular to China, if Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces are moved closer to China's borders. 49 On March 29, 2011, NSC Advisor Thomas Donilon spoke at the Carnegie Endowment stating, "In advance of a new treaty limiting tactical nuclear weapons, we also plan to consult with our Allies on reciprocal actions . . . as a first step, we would like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis concerning the numbers, locations and types of nonstrategic forces in Europe." 50 Background paper for Foreign Affairs Council, Defense Ministers, and Development Ministers, Brussels, December 8, 2010. The paper advocated "enhanced cooperation, with a view to spending resources in Europe more efficiently and to maintain a broad array of military capabilities to ensure national objectives as well as Europe's ability act credibly in crises." 51 See "Non-paper," proposals 1, 2. 52 Ibid. 
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